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1. Introduction1
Twenty years ago Kolm (1976a, 1976b) raised a number of problems which stimulated a lot
of research on inequality measurement. He was mainly interested in the concept of inequality,
the relationship between inequality and social welfare, and the characterization of inequality
measures and social welfare functions by means of axioms. The present paper contributes to
this discussion. First it presents a new (abstract) approach of defining inequality concepts and
describes the class of linear concepts completely. Second, it investigates the relation between
inequality and welfare for such concepts and proposes two general methods of deriving corre-
sponding ethical inequality indices in this framework. One type of index is related to the
familiar Atkinson-Kolm-Sen measure. The other method yields a new type of (dual) index
reflecting the inequality of living standard. Third, all separable social welfare orderings which
generate inequality measures compatible with linear inequality concepts are characterized; the
respective measures are presented. Fourth, the paper discusses the general properties of the
measures introduced. The dual measures are shown to be additively decomposable. Fifth, the
particular role of linear social welfare orderings (defined on rank-ordered income vectors) is
examined. They are consistent with all linear inequality concepts and therefore imply an
inequality ordering for every concept.
Economists usually distinguish between the size and the distribution of income; i.e. inequality
does not depend on average income. On the other hand, certain changes in income are
admitted which leave inequality unchanged. For the concept of relative inequality, the ranking
of incomes and relative inequality measures are invariant with respect to equal proportional
changes of incomes; for absolute inequality, the addition of the same amount to all incomes
does not alter inequality. These concepts of rightist and leftist inequality are well known.
Most researchers seem to be interested in and adhere to relative (rightist) inequality.
Nevertheless there has always been some discussion in the literature whether there exist
further reasonable concepts: Kolm (1976a + b)already proposed centrist measures; Bossert
and Pfingsten (1990) introduced the concept of intermediate inequality. Pfingsten/Seidl
(1994) and del Rio/Ruiz-Castillo (1996) deal with other new (more complicated) concepts.
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based on an unpublished discussion paper Ebert (1996).
Furthermore, several experimental tests by questionaire have been performed in order to
reveal attitudes to inequality (Amiel/Cowell (1992, 1997), Ballano/Ruiz-Castillo (1993),
Harrison/ Seidl (1994a, 1994b)). The questionaires are designed to investigate the acceptance
of the conventional assumptions employed in inequality measurement. In particular the
support of the relative, absolute, and intermediate views of inequality is examined by these
authors. They unanimously conclude that none of these concepts obtains universal consent.
Some individuals accept the relative, others the absolute or the intermediate inequality
concept. Even extreme rightist and leftist views are supported. Furthermore the attitude to
inequality depends on the size of income: the relative inequality concept may be acceptable
for low incomes, the absolute one for high incomes (or conversely). Therefore it seems
necessary to investigate inequality concepts in further detail and to make an attempt at
providing a theoretical model which might describe the empirical findings. This paper unifies
some of the approaches by providing an abstract and general definition of an inequality
concept. It makes the following contributions:
At first an inequality concept will be described by a set of feasible transformations leaving
inequality unaltered and defining an equivalence relation at the same time. A transformation
changes an income distribution in a systematic way (e.g. by scaling all incomes for relative
inequality) and generates another income distribution possessing the same degree of
inequality. The kind of transformations admitted is uniquely related to the view of inequality
and reflects normative judgments. It is obvious that the set of transformations has to satisfy
some specific properties if the definition is to make sense. Essentially, it has to be sufficiently
rich and the transformations have to be consistent with one another. If an inequality measure
is invariant with respect to such a set of transformations it satisfies the respective concept of
inequality. Below, as a first step linear inequality concepts are considered; i.e. the
corresponding set contains only linear transformations; the inequality measures are linearly
invariant. It turns out that the class of linear concepts comprises relative, absolute,
intermediate, and ‘ultra-rightist’ inequality. The latter one favours rich persons: even if the
ratio of a high income to a low income increases inequality remains unchanged. Probably few
people will agree with the implicit value judgement.
In the next step the relationship between social welfare orderings and inequality measures is
examined. This part of the paper extends the methodology to linear concepts and to the
abstract setting. Blackorby/Donaldson (1978), Ebert (1987a) considered relative inequality.
Ebert (1987b) treated absolute inequality as well. Dutta/Esteban (1992) discussed some
problems for relative inequality. Up to now there is no paper dealing rigorously with
intermediate (and ultra-rightist) inequality (the way Bossert and Pfingsten handle this
problem seems to be too ad hoc). The basic idea used below is to standardize income
distributions and then to consider the correponding welfare loss due to inequality. This
methodology can be adapted suitably and yields two types of measure depending on the way
of standardization: If mean income is normalized to a given standard, in principle generalized
Atkinson-Kolm-Sen measures (appropriately adapted to linear concepts) emerge. If
distributions are normalized to a given level of social welfare, a new type of index is
generated: a dual inequality measure, which is mainly based on the representative income
instead of mean income. It has been mentioned in the literature, but has never been defined
and treated rigorously.
Then both types of normative inequality measures are derived in this framework. They are
(ordinally) unique and belong to a linear inequality concept if the underlying social welfare
ordering is homogeneous with respect to the corresponding set of transformations. Therefore
it is important to characterize the class of social welfare orderings which fulfill the property
of homogeneity. For separable orderings these classes can be determined. Of course, one
obtains the class of Atkinson and Kolm-Pollak orderings for relative and absolute inequality.
For intermediate and ultra-rightist inequality a modification of Atkinson welfare orderings is
required.
Both types of measure derived possess the usual properties: They are anonymous, satisfy the
principle of progressive transfers, are positive and equal zero only at equality of incomes. An
interesting result is that both are ordinally equivalent: Though they are derived in different
ways they provide only different cardinalizations of the same inequality ordering. In so far
nothing new is implied. But the dual measures prove to be additively decomposable. They
inherit this property directly from the social welfare ordering. In this case the between-group
term is defined on a smoothed income distribution consisting of the representative - not
mean! - income of the respective groups. This reinforces the fact that the dual measures
reflect the inequality of living standard.
Finally linear social welfare orderings defined on rank-ordered income vectors are considered
(e.g. the welfare ordering generating the popular Gini-coefficient possesses this form). Since
the analysis is restricted to linear inequality concepts a linear ordering is homogeneous with
respect to all these transformations independently of the particular concept. Therefore for
each inequality concept a corresponding inequality measure (or ordering) can be generated. In
this case the researcher has got an additional degree of freedom. She can choose a linear
welfare ordering according to her view on social welfare and independently decide in favour
of a particular concept of inequality.
The results of this paper demonstrate that defining an inequality concept by means of a set of
suitable transformations is worthwhile. The abstract framework necessitates a new and
general approach to many problems. In particular the dual measures derived will prove
helpful whenever inequality is to be decomposed.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reconsiders the inequality concepts proposed in
the literature. Section 3 defines linear inequality concepts; section 4 determines all linear
concepts. Social welfare orderings are introduced in section 5. Then ethical inequality
measures are defined (section 6) and investigated (section 7). The next section derives all
ethical inequality measures which belong to a linear inequality concept if the welfare ordering
is separable. The decomposition of dual measures is examined in section 9. Finally, section
10 is devoted to linear social welfare orderings and section 11 offers some conclusions.
2. Inequality concepts reconsidered
We consider a fixed population consisting of n individuals. They are supposed to be identical
with respect to all attributes but possibly income. Let Ω ⊂ R  denote the set (interval) of
feasible incomes. Its definition will depend on the inequality concept chosen. Then X i ∈Ω
denotes individual i’s income ( , , )i n= 1K . An income distribution is given by a vector
X X X n= ( , , )1 K  belonging to the set of feasible income distributions Ω n nR⊂  which will
be defined below. The average income of X is abbreviated by µ ( )X
n
X i
i
n
=
=
∑1
1
. 1 denotes a
vector containing n ones.
There are essentially three concepts of inequality dealt with in the literature. Each concept is
characterized by an invariance property of the respective measures and orderings. For the
relative inequality concept inequality is unchanged if all incomes are changed in the same
proportion; i.e. a relative inequality measure I X( )  satisfies
( )I X I T X X Rreln n( ) ( ) := ∈ = >++λ λfor all andΩ 0 ,
where Tλ  belongs to
{ }Τ Ω Ωrel reln relnT T X X R∗ ++= → = ⋅ ∈λ λ λ λ: ( ) , .
Similarly an absolute inequality measure is characterized by
( )I X I T X X R Rabsn n( ) ( ) := ∈ = ∈α αfor all andΩ
where
{ }T T T X X Rabs absn absnα β β β β∈ = → = + ⋅ ∈∗Τ Ω Ω: ( ) ,1 .
Here inequality is not altered if all individuals receive the same amount of income in addition
to their income X i . These inequality concepts are well-known and seem to present two
extreme views of inequality. Kolm (1976 a) calls the respective measures rightist and leftist.
For relative inequality the ratio of two individuals’ incomes remains fixed, for absolute
inequality the difference. Bossert/Pfingsten (1990) filled the gap between both extremes by
introducing the concept of intermediate inequality. An inequality measure defined on Ωθ
n
satisfies the concept of θ -inequality for θ ∈ ( , )0 1  if it is invariant with respect to the set of
transformations
( ){ }Τ Ω Ωθ κ θ θ κ κ θ θ κ θ∗ = → = + ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ > −T T X X Xn n: ( ) ( ) /1 11 for
where Ωθ θ θ: ( / , ) : ( ) /= − ∞ = −1 1s sfor .
A transformation Tκ  is a combination of scaling and translating incomes. In this sense the θ -
inequality concept is an intermediate one: setting θ = 0  we obtain Τ Τθ θ∗ ∗= =abs , for 1 we
get Τ Τθ
∗ ∗
= rel . Furthermore one can prove that for an increase in income by means of a trans-
formation Τκ κ( )> 0  θ -inequality is unchanged, relative inequality measures register a
decrease and absolute ones an increase of inequality.
Obviously the inequality measures are invariant with respect to the transformations admitted.
Conversely, the respective set of transformations defines an equivalence relation. Consider
e.g. the case of relative inequality and define
X Y T Y T X
rel rel
~ : ( )Τ Τ∗ ⇔ ∈ =∗there exists such thatλ λ .
X Y
rel
~Τ∗  is an equivalence relation since it satisfies reflexivity, transitivity, and symmetry:
X X X T X
rel
~ ( )Τ∗ =since 1 ,
X Y Y Z X Z
rel rel rel
~ ~ ~Τ Τ Τ∗ ∗ ∗and implies
since, if ( )Y T X Z T Y Z T T X T X= = = =
⋅λ ν ν λ ν λ( ) ( ), ( ) ( )and then .
Finally, X Y Y X
rel rel
~ ~Τ Τ∗ ∗implies since X T Y Y T X= =λ λ( ) ( )/yields 1 .
Therefore, by definition X and Y possess the same degree of inequality whenever X Y
rel
~Τ∗ .
One can argue analogously for absolute and intermediate inequality. The set of
transformations admitted forms a basic characteristic of the respective inequality concept.
3. Definition of linear inequality concepts
The above inequality concepts were characterized by a corresponding invariance property of
inequality measures. In the following we will define inequality concepts by a corresponding
set of transformations. We postulate that inequality is not affected if an income distribution is
changed by a feasible transformation. It is obvious that the set of transformations has to fulfill
some properties if the definition is to be reasonable. These properties will be discussed in this
section . At first we introduce the set of transformations
{ }Τ Ω Ω∗ = → ∈T Dn nτ τ: ,
where the set of parameters D must be a nondegenerate interval of R. Therefore the set of
transformations can be characterized by one parameter. The parametrization is not unique, but
this aspect is not important in the following.
In this paper we confine ourselves to linear transformations satisfying
Property LIN (linear transformation)
There are two continuous functions, at least one strictly increasing, a D R: → ++  and
b D R: →  such that
T X a X b X and Dnτ τ τ τ( ) ( ) ( )= ⋅ + ⋅ ∈ ∈1 for Ω . (1)
A transformation is defined for income vectors X. The same notation will be employed for a
transformation of its components since there will be no ambiguity:
[ ]T X T X i ni iτ τ( ) : ( ) , ,= = 1K .
T Xτ ( )  is continuous and strictly increasing in X and continuous in the parameter τ . Since D
is connected the set { }T X Dτ τ( ) ∈  is also a connected subset of Ω n  for each X. It contains
all income distributions possessing the same inequality as distribution X according to the
inequality concept defined by Τ∗ . Transformations satisfying LIN are linear in X. One easily
recognizes that the concepts introduced in section 2 fulfill LIN. We observe that
a b rel( ) ( ) ,λ λ λ= = ∗and for0 Τ
a b abs( ) ( ) ,α α α= = ∗1 and for andΤ
a b( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )κ κθ κ κ θ θθ= + = − ∈∗1 1 0 1and for andΤ .
By definition T Xτ ( )  possesses the same inequality as X; but of course the reverse should be
true as well. In other words, ‘possessing the same inequality’ should be an equivalence
relation. Then three more properties are required:
Property REF (reflexivity)
The identity Te , defined by T X X for all Xe n( ) = ∈Ω , belongs to Τ∗ .
Property TRANS (transitivity)
If  T Tσ τ, ∈ ∗Τ , then the transformation ( )T X T T Xσ τ σ τo ( ): ( )=  belongs to Τ∗ .
Property SYM (symmetry)
If Tτ ∈ ∗Τ , then its inverse Tτ−1  belongs to Τ∗ .
They guarantee that Τ∗  defines an equivalence relation on Ω n  if one defines
X Y~ :Τ∗ ⇔ there is Tτ ∈
∗Τ  such that Y T X= τ ( ) . (2)
REF implies reflexivity, TRANS transitivity and SYM the symmetry of the relation. As a
consequence { }T X Dτ τ( ) ∈  is really an equivalence class of ~Τ∗ . Furthermore, the set Τ∗
forms a group (in the mathematical sense) if the composition of transformations is taken as
operation.
Now we are able to introduce the
Definition
A linear inequality concept is defined by a set of transformations Τ∗  satisfying LIN, REF,
TRANS, and SYM.
Relative, absolute and θ -intermediate inequality are linear inequality concepts since the
properties REF, TRANS, and SYM are fulfilled:
T X X T T T T T1
1
1( ) , ,/= = =⋅ −λ µ λ µ λ λo and  (see the discussion above)
T X X T T T T T0
1( ) , ,= = =+ − −α β α β α αo and
T X X T T T0 ( ) ,= = = + + ⋅ ⋅κ ν ρ ρ κ ν κ ν θo with
and withT Tκ σ σ κ κθ− = = − +1 1/ ( ) .
The next section determines all linear inequality concepts.
4. The class of linear inequality concepts
The properties defining a linear inequality concept seem to be weak at first sight but have
strong implications. They impose some structure on the set of transformations. We establish
Proposition 1
A set of transformations Τ∗  satisfies LIN, REF, TRANS, and SYM if and only if there is a
parameterization of Τ∗  such that either
(i) a and b for D R and Rn n( ) ( )τ τ τ τ= = ∈ = =1 Ω (type (i)) (3)
or
(ii) a and b d for D R( ) ( ) ( )τ τ τ τ τ= = − ∈ = ++1 ,
an arbitrary d R and where dn dn d∈ = = ∞, : ( , )Ω Ω Ω (type (ii)) (4)
Obviously there are not many possibilities of choosing a( )τ  and b( )τ . Essentially there are
only two types of linear inequality concepts. Type (i) corresponds to absolute inequality. Type
(ii) depends on the additional parameter d. For d = 0  we obtain the concept of relative
inequality. If d is negative θ -inequality is implied since
( )T X X Xκ κ θ θ( ) ( )= + ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅1 1
can be rearranged to
T X X d dτ τ τ τ κ θ θ θ( ) ( ) ( ) /= ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ = + ⋅ = − −1 1 11 for and .
Then Τ∗  is identical with Τθ
∗
 for θ ∈( , )0 1  and Ωdn  with Ωθn .
New concepts are given for positive parameters d. Their respective set of transformations is
denoted by Τd∗  and their domain by Ωd  ; i.e. the set of feasible income distributions Ωdn
forms a subset of the positive orthant. (The notation Τd∗  will also be employed if d < 0 .) A
close inspection of these transformations demonstrates that these concepts are even ‘more
rightist’ than that of relative inequality. Suppose e.g. that d equals unity: d = 1  and choose the
income distribution X = ( , )2000 4000 . Application of Tτ  for τ = 2  implies
T Xτ ( ) ( , )= 3000 7000 . According to this concept both distributions possess the same degree
of inequality. The lower income is increased by 50 %, the higher one by 75 %. Therefore
these concepts are called d-ultra-rightist. There will probably be few adherents of these
concepts.
Summarizing this discussion we obtain
Proposition 2
The class of linear inequality concepts comprises (only) the concepts of  relative, absolute,
θ -intermediate, and d-ultra-rightist inequality.
Thus the class can be completely described. Now we prove the above result:
Proof of Proposition 1
Choose any transformations T Tσ τ, ∈
∗Τ . LIN implies
( ) ( )T T X a a X a b bσ τ σ τ σ τ σ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅1.
Now define Tρ  by T T Tρ σ τ:= o  and κ  by ρ κ σ τ= ( , ) . By LIN Tρ  must possess the form (1).
Because of TRANS it belongs to Τ∗ . Therefore the functions a and b have to satisfy the
functional equations
( )a a a a( ) ( , ) ( ) ( )ρ κ σ τ σ τ= = ⋅ (5)
( )b b a a b( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )ρ κ σ τ σ τ σ= = ⋅ + (6)
Since D is a nondegenerate interval by assumption and since REF and SYM are satisfied,
Theorem 3 in Aczel (1966) can be applied to (6).
The theorem yields that κ  is a continuous group operation for the parameter σ  and τ . Thus
there is a monotone and continuous function g D R: →  such that ( )κ σ τ σ τ( , ) ( ) ( )= +−g g g1
and therefore
( ) ( ) ( )a g g g a g g a g g− − −+ = ⋅1 1 1( ( ) ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))σ τ σ τ
and
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )b g g g a g g b g g b g g− − − −+ = ⋅ +1 1 1 1( ( ) ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))σ τ σ τ σ .
Defining ( ) ( )$( ) ( ) , $( ) ( ) , ( )a v a g v b v b g v v g= = =− −1 1 σ , and w g= ( )τ  we obtain
$( ) $( ) $( )a v w a v a w+ = ⋅
$( ) $( ) $( ) $( )b v w a v b w b v+ = ⋅ + .
Theorem 1, p. 150 in Aczel (1966) and its Corollary provide the general solution of the
second functional equation (which also satisfies the first one): There are constants c and d
such that
either  (i) $( ) $( )a t b t d t d= = ⋅ ≠1 0and for and t R∈
or (ii) $( ) $( ) ( )a t e b t d e t Rct ct= = − ∈and for1 .
(The trivial solution is impossible since the transformation Tτ  has to be increasing.)
Inserting the solution and returning to a and b yields
T X X d gτ τ( ) ( )= + ⋅ 1
or T X e X d ecg cgτ
τ τ( ) ( )( ) ( )= ⋅ + −1 1 .
Conversely, it is obvious that these transformations satisfy REF, TRANS, and SYM.
Finally we consider some particular properties of the set of transformations characterized by
Proposition 1. Usually they change the average income of the distribution transformed; i.e. an
equivalence class of ~Τ∗  contains distributions having different average incomes. Later on,
when ethical inequality measures are defined, income distributions will be normalized for
income. Thus the question arises whether for each degree of inequality (or in each
equivalence class) there is an income distribution for any possible per-capita income ε ∈Ω .
The answer is affirmative. Let S Xε  denote a transformation in Τ∗  which maps a given
distribution X into a distribution with the average income ε .
Then we obtain
Proposition 3
Assume that Τ∗  defines a linear inequality concept.
a) There is a transformation S Xε ∈ ∗Τ  for every X n∈Ω  and ε ∈Ω .
b) S Xε  is unique.
c) Τ∗  is equal to { }S Xε ε ∈Ω  for every X n∈Ω .
d) ( )S T X S XT X Xε ε( ) ( ) ( )=  for X n∈Ω , T ∈ ∗Τ , and ε ∈Ω .
e) S YXε ( )  is continuous in ε  for all X Y n, ∈Ω .
For a linear inequality concept a transformation S Xε  exists and is unique. Therefore there is
exactly one income distribution with average income ε  in each equivalence class. Part c) of
Proposition 3 demonstrates again that the set Τ∗  depends only on one parameter. Part d)
seems to be a bit technical, but it makes perfect sense: X and T X( )  possess the same degree
of inequality and belong to the same equivalence class of ~Τ∗ . Since there is exactly one
(normalized) distribution X with mean income ε  in each equivalence class (by part b), every
income distribution belonging to the equivalence class of X is mapped into the same normal-
ized distribution.
Proof of Proposition 3
a) S Xε  must be equal to a Tτ ∈ ∗Τ . Choose τ ε µ= − ( )X  and ( )τ ε µ= − −( ) / ( )d X d
for type (i) and type (ii), respectively.
b) Obvious.
c) { }S Xε ε ∈ ⊂ ∗Ω Τ  by definition. Conversely, consider any Tτ ∈ ∗Τ  and define
( )ε µ τ: ( )= T X . Then T S Xτ ε= .
d) T must be equal to a transformation S Xη . The definition of these transformations
implies
S
S X X
S X X S X X
ε
η
η ε
( )
( ) ( )  =
e) Obvious.
5. Inequality concepts and social welfare
Since it is our objective to derive ethical inequality measures we have to introduce social
welfare orderings ≥W  in a first step. A welfare ordering ≥W  is defined on Ωn  and has to
satisfy
Property WELF (welfare)
≥W  is continuous, strictly increasing and S-concave.
Monotonicity is related to the Pareto principle: Any increase in income improves welfare as
well. S-concavity implies anonymity and the Pigou-Dalton principle: Progressive transfers
from a richer to a poorer individual which do not change the ranking of their incomes
increases social welfare. These are basic attributes of a social welfare ordering.
In order to obtain normatively significant inequality measures we need two more properties:
Property EDEI
For every X n∈Ω  an equally distributed equivalent income (EDEI) ξ ( )X  exists such that
X XW~ ( )ξ 1
Property Τ∗ -HOM (homogeneity)
X Y T X T Y for every X Y and TW W n~ ( ) ~ ( ) ,⇒ ∈ ∈ ∗Ω Τ
The existence of an equally distributed equivalent income is in general not guaranteed. There-
fore it has to be postulated explicitly. It is well-known that ξ ( )X  is a representation of the
welfare ordering ≥W . It can be interpreted as the representative income of the population
considered. Τ∗ -homogeneity is the generalization of (linear) homogeneity of the welfare
function in the framework of relative inequality, or the analogue to translatability for the con-
cept of  absolute inequality. These properties have some further implications:
Proposition 4
a) EDEI implies that ξ ε ε( 1) =  for all ε ∈Ω .
b) If EDEI and T ∗ -HOM are satisfied, then
( ) ( )ξ ξT X T X( ) ( )=  for X n∈Ω , T ∈ ∗Τ . (7)
c) EDEI and Τ∗ -HOM imply:
X Y T X T Y for X Y TW W n≥ ⇒ ≥ ∈ ∈ ∗( ) ( ) , ,Ω Τ .
The equally distributed equivalent income is a particular representation of ≥W . Its normali-
zation proves to be attractive if the welfare ordering is in addition Τ∗ -homogeneous. The
EDEI of a transformed income distribution T X( )  can be computed by the transformation of
the EDEI of X . This property allows to extend Τ∗ -homogeneity from the symmetric part of
≥W  to the entire ordering.
For the rest of the paper we assume that WELF, EDEI, and Τ∗ -HOM are satisfied.
The proofs of these assertions are simple:
Proof of Proposition 4
a) Suppose that X = ε 1 . Then
ξ ε ε( 1 1) ~W
which yields the result because of the monotonicity of ≥W .
b) By EDEI X X~W ξ ( )1  and ( )T X T X( ) ( )~W ξ 1 . Τ∗ -HOM implies
( )T X T X( ) ( )~W ξ 1 ,
and therefore ( ) ( )ξ ξT X T X( ) ( )= .
c) X Y X YW≥ ⇔ ≥ξ ξ( ) ( )
( ) ( )⇔ ≥T X T Yξ ξ( ) ( )  since T is increasing
( ) ( )⇔ ≥ξ ξT X T Y( ) ( )  because of b)
⇔ ≥T X T YW( ) ( )  by definition 
Above it was demonstrated that each equivalence class of ~Τ∗  contains exactly one distri-
bution with mean income ε  (for every ε ∈Ω ). If a social welfare ordering is Τ∗ -homo-
geneous a similar result obtains: The intersection of a Τ∗ -equivalence class with any social
indifference curve is always nonempty and consists of exactly one income distribution. Given
a certain level of social welfare we can find a distribution for any degree of inequality and,
conversely, for any degree of inequality we are able to determine an income distribution
which yields any level of welfare. This property will be useful in the next section when a new
type of ethical inequality measure is defined.
But at first we have to prove the above claim. It is easy to see that the range of ξ ( )X  coin-
cides with Ω . Therefore we introduce the notation RuX  in analogy to S
X
ε  for any X
n∈Ω  and
u ∈Ω . While S Xε  maps X into a distribution with the average income ε , RuX  denotes a
transformation in Τ∗  which maps the distribution X into a distribution yielding the level of
social welfare u when measured by the EDEI: ( )ξ R X uuX ( ) = . Thus there is an analogy
between the definition of S Xε  and that of RuX . But there is also one important difference: S
X
ε
is completely determined by the underlying inequality concept Τ∗ . Unlike S Xε  the
transformation Ru
X
 depends also on the (social welfare function and the) EDEI considered.
Since it is always clear which EDEI ξ  is under conderation the shorthand R YuX ( )  is used
instead of the more precise R YuX ( , )ξ  . Then we obtain:
Proposition 5
Assume that Τ∗  defines a linear inequality concept and that ≥W  satisfies WELF, EDEI, and
Τ∗ -HOM.
a) There is a transformation RuX ∈ ∗Τ  for every X n∈Ω  and u ∈Ω .
b) RuX  is unique.
c) Τ∗  is equal to { }R uuX ∈Ω  for every X n∈Ω .
d) ( )R T X R XuT X uX( ) ( ) ( )=  for X n∈Ω , T ∈ ∗Τ , and u ∈Ω .
e) R YuX ( )  is continuous in u for all X Y n, ∈Ω .
The proof runs along the same lines as that of Proposition 3:
Proof of Proposition 5
a) RuX  must be equal to a transformation Τ Ττ ∈ ∗ .
Choose τ µ: ( )= −u X  and ( )τ ξ= − −( ) / ( )u d X d  for type (i) and type (ii), respectively.
b) Obvious.
c) { }R uuX ∈ ⊂ ∗Ω Τ  by definition. Conversely, consider any Tτ ∈ ∗Τ  and define
( )u T X: ( )= ξ τ . Then T RuXτ = .
d) T must be equal to a transformation RvX . The definition of these transformations
implies
R
u
R
v
X X
R
v
X X R
u
X X
( )
( ) ( )  = .
e) Obvious. 
Thus the properties of Ru
X
 are in principle the same as those of S Xε , only the normalization is
different. Therefore the interpretation provided for Proposition 3 applies analogously.
6. Ethical inequality measures: definition
For a derivation of normatively significant inequality measures (or orderings) a
decomposition of social welfare functions (or orderings) is necessary: One has to distinguish
between the size and the distribution of income as determinants of social welfare (cf. Ebert
(1987a)). Informally, we have to split up2 the social welfare function ξ ( )X  into two
components, average income µ ( )X  and inequality K X( ) :
( )ξ µ( ) ( ), ( )X F X K X=
where F is increasing in mean income and decreasing in inequality. One kind of
decomposition can be accomplished easily:
( )ξ µ µ ξ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )X X X X= − − . (8)
For such a decomposition, inequality measures can be defined by standardizing the income
distribution X and using the measure K. We will present two different methods of
standardization. The first one normalizes with respect to average income. Choose an arbitrary
average income ε  and keep it fixed. Then transform the income distribution X  to S XXε ( ) .
By definition the average income is changed to ε . We obtain
( ) ( )ξ εε εS X F K S XX X( ) , ( ( ))= (9)
and therefore ( ) ( )K S X F S XX Xε εε ξ( ) , ( ( )= −1 .
Now define the inequality of X by ( )K S XXε ( ) . The measure is normatively significant
because
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )K S X K S Y S X S Y X YX Y X Y nε ε ε εξ ξ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,≥ ⇔ ≤ ∈for Ω .
Since average income is standardized to ε , inequality and welfare are negatively correlated.
Using (8) the inequality measure is defined by
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 The first part of this section generalizes the method proposed in Ebert (1997) for homothetic social welfare
functions to arbitrary welfare orderings.
( ) ( )I X S X S X XX X n( , ): ( ) ( )ε µ ξ εε ε= − ∈ ∈for all andΩ Ω . (10)
It can be interpreted in the usual way: I X( , )ε  reflects the welfare loss due to inequality if a
distribution is normalized to ( )µ εεS XX ( ) =  (cf. Figure 1). Indeed, the definition is an exten-
sion of the Atkinson-Kolm-Sen concept to the more general framework. Since ≥W  is Τ∗ -
homogeneous and S Xε  can be determined explicitly (cf. the proof of Proposition 3 a) we
obtain
( )I X S XX( , ) ( )ε ε ξε= −
=
−
− −
−
−









µ ξ
ε
ξ
µ
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
X X
d X d
X d
for type (i)
for type (ii)1
(11)
In other words, I X( , )ε  is related3 to the ethical measures known: For absolute inequality
(type (i)) it possesses the usual form. The same is true for relative inequality if d = 0  and ε
is set to unity. The properties of I X( , )ε  will be discussed in the next section.
The decomposition of social welfare (8) can be exploited in another way. Instead of standard-
izing with respect to average income ε  (as I X( , )ε  does) we can normalize with respect to
the level of social welfare u: Fix u ∈Ω  and transform an income distribution X to R XuX ( ) .
By definition of RuX  we get ( )ξ R X uuX ( ) =  and obtain
( ) ( )u R X F R X K R XuX uX uX= =ξ µ( ) ( ( )), ( ( )) . (12)
Correspondingly we define the inequality of X by ( )K R XuX ( ) . It can also be measured by the
average income ( )µ R XuX ( )  because
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )K R X K R Y R X R Y X YuX uY uX uY n( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,≥ ⇔ ≥ ∈µ µ for Ω .
Since the level of social welfare is fixed to u, greater inequality has to be compensated by
greater average income. Therefore inequality and average income are positively correlated.
Employing the decomposition (8) we define
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 The indexes I X( , )ε  depend on the (type of) inequality concept. We abstain from using an additional
subscript.
( ) ( )I X u R X R X X uuX uX n( , ): ( ) ( )= − ∈ ∈µ ξ for all andΩ Ω . (13)
It can be interpreted as welfare loss due to inequality as well. Figure 2 illustrates the
definition. Since welfare is standardized to u, the inequality ordering represented by
( )I X u R X uuX( , ) ( )= −µ  is the same as that implied by ( )µ R XuX ( ) .
The linearity of the inequality concept again yields a simple representation of I X u( , )  (cf. the
proof of Proposition 5 a):
( )I X u R X uuX( , ) ( )= −µ
=
−
−
−
−
−









µ ξ
µ
ξ
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
X X
u d X d
X d
for type (i)
for type (ii)1
(14)
For a type (i) inequality concept I X u( , )  coincides with I X( , )ε  for all ε ,u ∈Ω . Thus
nothing new is implied. But if the transformations of Τ∗  belong to type (ii) the measures
I X u( , )  are new. Both types of measure are examined in greater detail in the next section.
Equation (8) presents one possible way of decomposing social welfare. Obviously other
forms of decomposition could have been used instead, e.g.
ξ µ ξ
µ
( ) ( ) ( )( )X X
X
X
= − −







1 1 .
Therefore the question arises how the inequality measures developed depend on the split-up.
Fortunately, it turns out that the measures I X( , )ε  and I X u( , ) , respectively, always repre-
sent the same inequality ordering: Suppose that ( )ξ µ( ) ( ), ( )X F X K X=  where F  is
increasing in µ  and decreasing in K . Employing (9) and ( ) ( )ξ εε εS X F K S XX X( ) , ( ( ))=  we
obtain
( )
( ) ( )
I X K S X F F S X K S X
F F K S X F F I X
X X X
X
( , ) ( ( )) , ( ( ( )), ( ( )))
, ( , ( ( )) , ( , ( , ))
ε ε µ
ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε
ε
= =
= =
−
− −
1
1 1
;
i.e. both inequality measures are ordinally equivalent, since the function ( )F F− ⋅1 ε ε, ( , )  is
strictly increasing. Similarly, equation (12) yields that ( )K R X G R XuX uX( ( )) ( ( ))= µ  and
( )K R X G R XuX uX( ( )) ( ( ))= µ , where G and G  are strictly increasing. That implies
( ) ( ) ( )I X u K R X G G K R X G G I X uuX uX( , ) ( ) ( ( ( ))) ( ( , ))= = =− −1 1 .
I X u( , )  and I X u( , )  are possibly different cardinalizations of the same inequality ordering.
Thus the way of splitting-up does not matter: One can choose any function F and index
K X( ) , respectively; i.e. we have established
Proposition 6
The measures
( ) ( )I X S X S XX X( , ) ( ) ( )ε µ ξε ε= −
and ( ) ( )I X u R X R XuX uX( , ) ( ) ( )= −µ ξ
define a unique inequality ordering for every ε ,u ∈Ω .
The measures I X u( , )  and I X( , )ε  are called dual measures: Deriving I X( , )ε  the average
income of X is changed to ε , the measure is ordinally equivalent to the resulting equally
distributed income and level of social welfare. For I X u( , )  the level of social welfare implied
by X is altered to u. Then the measure is essentially defined by the corresponding average
income.
7. Ethical inequality measures: properties
Whenever the transformations characterizing a linear inequality concept Τ∗  are of type (ii),
i.e. if Τ Τ∗ ∗= d , the measures I X( , )ε  and I X u( , )  possess different forms:
I X d X X
X d
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ε ε
µ ξ
µ
= −
−
−
 and
I X u u d X X
X d
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )= −
−
−
µ ξ
ξ .
According to the way of standardization they normalize the welfare loss due to inequality
differently: I X( , )ε  is essentially normalized with resepct to the average income (neglecting
for the moment the other constants!). Therefore it equals the per-capita welfare loss due to
inequality expressed in money per $ income and is bounded above by 1. On the other hand,
I X u( , )  is normalized by the equally distributed equivalent income ξ ( )X . The latter can be
interpreted as representative income, being equivalent to the average living standard of the
population whereas the average income µ ( )X  is related to the possibilities individuals face
(cf. Blackorby/Donaldson/Auersperg (1981)). The dual measure is unbounded above since the
welfare loss might be arbitrarily high in comparison to ξ ( )X .
The attributes of I X( , )ε  and I X u( , )  depend on the properties of the underlying welfare
ordering and of the set of transformation Τ∗ . It turns out that the measures are attractive. We
establish:
Proposition 7
Assume that Τ∗  defines a linear inequality concept and that ≥W  satisfies WELF, EDEI, and
Τ∗ -HOM.
a) I X( , )ε  and I X u( , )  are Τ∗ -invariant:
( ) ( )I T X I X and I T X u I X u
for all X T un
( ), ( , ) ( ), ( , )
, , , .
ε ε
ε
= =
∈ ∈ ∈∗Ω Τ Ω
b) I X( , )ε  and I X u( , )  are symmetric.
c) I X( , )ε  and I X u( , )  satisfy the principle of progressive transfers (inequality is
decreased).
d) I X( , )ε  and I X u( , )  are nonnegative. They equal zero if and only if X = α1  for
α ∈Ω .
e) I X( , )ε  and I X u( , )  represent the same inequality ordering for all ε ,u ∈Ω .
Τ∗ -homogeneity and the procedure proposed above guarantee (in connection with the other
assumptions) that the inequality measures are Τ∗ -invariant. This is obviously a necessary
condition for any sensible definition of measures. On the other hand it implies that all income
distributions belonging to an equivalence class of ~Τ∗  possess the same degree of inequality
or are contained in the same equivalence class of the inequality ordering. The converse is not
true since the inequality ordering is not only  Τ∗ -invariant, but also symmetric. This property
is inherited from the social welfare ordering. Therefore several equivalence classes of the
equivalence relation ~Τ∗  yield the same degree of inequality. Progressive transfers diminish
inequality. Thus the Pigou-Dalton principle is fulfilled. The range of I X( , )ε  and I X u( , )  is
appropriate. Furthermore the measures indicate inequality whenever incomes are not equal.
The last result e) is surprising: Looking at the functional forms (11) and (14) of I X( , )ε  and
I X u( , ) , respectively, one immediately recognizes that the ordering represented by
[ ]I X I X u( , ) ( , )ε  does not depend on [ ]ε ∈ ∈Ω Ωu : A change in ε  and u implies only a
scaling of the respective measure. But the measures I X( , )ε  and I X u( , )  seem to be
different, at first sight, since they normalize the welfare loss due to inequality differently:
Nevertheless, the orderings implied coincide. Therefore, for a given linear inequality concept
only one inequality ordering is derivable from ≥W .
Proof of Proposition 7
a) Consider I X( , )ε  and any T ∈ ∗Τ . Then Proposition 3 d) and the definition of
I X( , )ε  yield
( ) ( ) ( )I T X S T X S T XT X T X( ), ( ( )) ( ( ))( ) ( )ε µ ξε ε= −
( ) ( )= − =µ ξ εε εS X S X I XX X( ) ( ) ( , ) .
For I X u( , )  apply Proposition 5 d).
b) Obvious because of WELF.
c) A progressive transfer increases ξ ( )X  and therefore decreases I X( , )ε  and I X u( , ) .
d) Obvious.
e) We obtain for an inequality concept characterized by Τd∗ .
I X d
d
I X( , ) ( )( ) ( , )ε
ε
η
η= −
−
and
I X u u d
v d
I X v u v( , ) ( )( ) ( , ) , , ,=
−
−
∈for ε η Ω .
Furthermore set ε = = +u d 1 . Then
( )I X g I X u( , ) ( , )ε =
for g t t( ) / ( )= − +1 1 1
which is a strictly increasing function.
8. Determination of Τ∗ -invariant inequality measures
A survey of the literature on inequality measurement demonstrates that most ethical measures
considered are based on separable welfare orderings. Therefore we now focus the analysis on
this type of ordering and introduce
Property SEP (separability)
The social welfare ordering ≥W  can be represented by a separable welfare function; i.e.
there is a continuous monotone function f such that
ξ ( ) ( )X f
n
f X
i
n
i=



−
=
∑1
1
1
.
f is called a characteristic function of ≥W .
The characteristic function is not unique. Any increasing affine transformation of f can be
used as well. Furthermore, the formulation of SEP excludes rank-dependent orderings a
priori. Some of them will be investigated in the next section. Property SEP implies Property
EDEI. Thus it is stronger.
Imposing SEP we are able to characterize and derive the class of Τ∗ -homogeneous welfare
functions for any linear inequality concept Τ∗ . At first we obtain a technical result which is
interesting in itself:
Lemma 8
A social welfare ordering ≥W  satisfying the property SEP is Τ∗ -homogeneous if and only if
( )f T f t c t e for T and Dτ ττ τ τ( ( )) ( ) ( )− ∗= ⋅ + ∈ ∈1 Τ .
Separability has strong implications for the interplay of the characteristic function f and the
transformations Tτ ∈
∗Τ .
Proof of Lemma 8
Suppose that ≥W  is Τ
∗
-homogeneous. Then Proposition 4 yields
( ) ( )T X T X X Tnξ ξ( ) ( )= ∈ ∈ ∗for andΩ Τ .
Because of SEP we obtain
T f
n
f X f
n
f T Xi i− −∑ ∑ 



 =
 1 1
1 1( ) ( ( ))
which is equivalent to
( )f T f
n
f X
n
f T Xi i− ∑ ∑ 



 =1
1 1( ( )) ( ) .
Define t
n
f Xi i: ( )=
1
. Then X i  is equal to f nti−1 ( ) . Substitution of X i  leads to
( )( ) ( )f T f t
n
f T f nti i− −∑ ∑=1 11( ) ( ( )) .
Theorem 1 and its Corollary in Aczel (1966), p. 142 imply that there are constants c and e
such that
( )f T f t c t e( ( ))− = ⋅ +1
(and ( )1 1
n
f T f nt c t e
n
( ( ))− = ⋅ + which is equivalent).
Therefore, if ≥W  is Τ
∗
-homogeneous, the characteristic function f has to satisfy
( )f T f t c t e T Dτ ττ τ τ( ( )) ( ) ( )− ∗= ⋅ + ∈ ∈1 for andΤ .
The converse is obvious.
Using the Lemma we are able to establish
Proposition 9
A Τ∗ -homogeneous welfare ordering ≥W  satisfying the Properties WELF and SEP is repre-
sented either by (i)
W X
n
e for if
abs
X
i
n
iγ γ
γ
γ( ) ln= − > ∗ = ∗−
=
∑1 1 0
1
Τ Τ
or by (ii)
Wd X
n i
n
Xi d d
Xi d
n d
i
n
for
for if d
δ
δ
δ
δ δ
δ
( )
( )
/
( ) /
,
*
= =
∑ −



 +
− +
=
∏





< ≠
= =
∗
1
1
1
1
1
1 0
0 Τ Τ
.
The class (i) contains all Kolm-Pollak social welfare functions. Here the elements of Τ∗  are
of type (i). If the transformation belonging to Τ∗  belongs to type (ii), ≥W  is represented by a
function Wd
δ
 which coincides with an Atkinson welfare function for d = 0 . The characteri-
zation result is not really surprising. It is well-known that intermediate inequality measures
are somehow related to some extended form of the Atkinson social functions (cf.
Bossert/Pfingsten (1990)). Therefore the same should be true for ultra-rightist measures, but
the class Wd
δ
 for d ≠ 0  has not been characterized up to now.
Proof of Proposition 9
If T tτ ( )  is of type (i), it is well known that the social welfare ordering is represented by a
Kolm-Pollak welfare function (cf. e.g. Blackorby/Donaldson (1980), Ebert (1988)).
Employ Lemma 7 and suppose that Tτ  possesses the form
T X X dτ τ τ( ) ( )= ⋅ + −1 1 (type (ii)).
Then we obtain
( )f t d d c f t eτ τ τ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )− + = ⋅ + .
Define t t d f t f t d: $ $( ): ( )= + = +and .
We get
f t d c f t d e( $ ) ( ) ( $ ) ( )τ τ τ+ = ⋅ + +
and $( $) ( ) $( $) ( )f t c f t eτ τ τ= ⋅ + .
The solution to this equation is given by Theorem 2.7.3 in Eichhorn (1978):
$( $) log $f t h t k= ⋅ +
or $( $) $f t l t k= ⋅ +δ
where h ≠ 0 , l ≠ 0 , δ ≠ 0  and k are arbitrary real constants. This implies
$ $( )
/
/
f
n
f Xi n
Xi
Xi
n
− ∑  =
∑ 
∏



≠
1 1
1 1
1
0δ δ δfor
otherwise
.
The rest of part (ii) follows from the definition of  f and S-concavity.
Using Proposition 9 one can directly determine the corresponding inequality measures based
on both methods proposed above. We obtain
Proposition 10
(i) The ordering ≥W  represented by W Xγ ( )  generates
( )I X I X u J X
n
e for all X
and u
X X
i
n
ni( , ) ( , ) ( ): ln
, .
( )ε
γ
ε
γ γ µ
= = = − ∈
∈
−
=
∑1 1
1
Ω
Ω
(ii) The ordering ≥W  represented by W Xdδ ( )  generates
I X Jd X
d
n i
n
Xi d
X d
for
d i
n
Xi d
n
X d
for
( , ) ( , ):
( )
( )
/
( ) ,
( )
( ) /
( )
ε δ ε
ε
δ
δ
µ
δ δ
ε
µ
δ
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− −
=
∑ −



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−

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



< ≠
−
=
∏ −
−






=


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
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1
1
1
1
1 0
1
1
0
1
1
and
I X u Jd X u
u d X d
n i
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Xi d
for
u d X d
i
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Xi d
n
for
( , ) ( , ):
( ) ( )
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( ) /
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−
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−
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
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< ≠
−
−
=
∏ −
−





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=
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A Kolm-Pollak social welfare function implies an absolute inequality measure. The normali-
zation does not play a role: I X( , )ε  and I X u( , )  are independent of ε  and u, respectively
and coincide. W Xdδ ( )  is related to a Τd∗ -invariant inequality measure. For d = 0  we obtain
measures of relative inequality4 (implied by an Atkinson-welfare function). For negative d,
measures of intermediate inequality5 are generated, for positive d-ultra-rightist measures. As
proved in Proposition 7 I X( , )ε  and I X u( , )  represent the same inequality ordering. But the
dual measures I X u( , )  presented in Proposition 10 are nevertheless interesting in themselves:
they possess an attractive decomposition property which will be discussed now.
9. Decomposition of dual measures
Suppose in this section that the population size is variable and that there is a social welfare
ordering ≥Wn  on Ω
n
 for each n ≥ 2 , represented by
ξ n
i
n
iX f
n
f X( ) ( )= 

−
=
∑1
1
1
.
Then the welfare ordering fulfills a decomposition property
( )X X XW k k k l l ln~ ( ) , ( )ξ ξ1 1
whenever ( )X X X X X X Xk l k k n= = +( , ) ( , , ), ( , , )1 1K K  and n k l= +  (cf. e.g. Ebert (1988)
or proof by direct computation). It means that the level of social welfare is unchanged if an
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 The measures J X ud0 ( , )  are already discussed in Ebert (1997).
income distribution is smoothed, i.e. if each individual receives its group’s representative
income ξ i iX i( ) ( , )= 1 2  instead of its actual income. This property can be exploited to
establish
Proposition 11
If I X un ( , )  is implied by ≥Wn  represented by W Xγ ( )  or W Xdδ ( ) , then it satisfies
[ ] ( )( )u,)X(,)X(I)u,X(Iw)u,X(Iw)u,X(I lllkkknlllkkkn 11 ξξ+⋅+⋅=
for all k l k l n nd X X Xk l n, , ( , )> + = = ∈1 a Ω ,
where (i) w k nk = /  and w l nl = /  if W Xγ ( )  represents the generating welfare ordering
and (ii) w k
n
X d
X d
w
l
n
X d
X dk
k
k
n
l
l
l
n
=
−
−
=
−
−
ξ
ξ
ξ
ξ
( )
( ) ,
( )
( ) and w wk l+ ≥ 1 otherwise.
Obviously the dual measures are additively decomposable into the sum of a within-group
term and a between-group term. In contrast to the usual form of additively decomposable
measures (cf. e.g. Shorrocks (1980, 1984)) between-group inequality does not depend on
mean incomes, but on the groups’ equally distributed equivalent income. Since the indices
I X u( , )  compare the welfare loss due to inequality with the representative income, the
(different) smoothing procedure makes perfect sense: The dual measures focus on the living
standard. Within-group inequality corresponds to a weighted sum of the inequality within
subgroups. For absolute inequality the weights correspond to the population shares and sum
up to unity. For relative, intermediate and d-ultra-rightist inequality the sum of the weighting
factors generally exceeds one, a phenomenon also known for most generalized entropy
measures.
At this point one should recall that the indices I X( , )ε  and I X u( , )  represent the same
inequality ordering and that - if the concept of relative inequality is considered - they must be
equivalent to a generalized entropy measure. Therefore the inequality orderings implied by
                                                                                                                                                       
5
 Eichhorn (1988) characterizes the family J Xdδ ε( , )  directly (for d < 0 ).
W Xd
δ ( )  possess different cardinalizations which are additively decomposable: The dual
measure J X ud
δ ( , )  is ordinally equivalent to the generalized entropy measure6
E X
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for
for
for
Of course, the weights and the smoothing procedure used in a decomposition of a generalized
entropy class differ from those presented above. They are based on the respective mean
incomes.
Proof of Proposition 11
We consider case (ii). Using the definition of measures and weights we obtain
( )( )u,)X(,)X(I)u,X(Iw)u,X(Iw lllkkknlllkkk 11 ξξ++
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for the right-hand side.
It reduces to
( ) ( )( )u d
X d
X d
n
n
− −
−
−



1
µ
ξ
1
because of the decomposition property of ≥Wn .
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 This ‘generalization’ of the generalized entropy class is proposed by Cowell (1997).
Finally
wk wl
k
n k
X k l
n l
X l d
X dn
+ =
+ −
−
ξ ξ
ξ
( ) ( )
( ) .
Now observe that
( ) ( )f k
n
X l
n
X k
n
f X l
n
f Xk k l l k k l lξ ξ ξ ξ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )+  ≥ +
by Jensen’s inequality.
Since f −1  is strictly increasing we obtain
( )
k
n
X l
n
X f k
n
f X l
n
f X
X X X
k
k
l
l
k
k
l
l
n k
k
k l
l
l n
ξ ξ ξ ξ
ξ ξ ξ ξ
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))
( ) , ( ) ( )
+ ≥ + 
= =
−1
1 1
which implies w wk l+ ≥ 1 .
The proof for case (i) runs along the same lines.
10. Linear social welfare orderings
The Pigou-Dalton principle forms one of the basic welfare judgements on a social welfare
ordering. As a consequence any representation is strictly Schur-concave, a property a linear
welfare function normally does not satisfy. Nevertheless there is a large class of linear social
welfare functions (and of underlying welfare orderings), namely those defined on rank-
ordered income vectors. Probably the most popular one is the welfare ordering generating the
Gini-coefficient. Donaldson/Weymark (1980) and Weymark (1981) were the first who
introduced and investigated some generalizations. The entire class is characterized, e.g. in
Ebert (1988). We briefly discuss these orderings since each of them is Τ∗ -homogeneous for
all linear inequality concepts Τ∗ .
Let X X X n
n
[ ] [ ] [ ]( , , )= ∈1 K Ω  be the ordered vector X; i.e. X [ ]  is a permutation of X such
that X Xi i[ ] [ ]≥ +1  for i n= −1 1,K . Incomes are decreasing in i. Then a linear social welfare
ordering ≥W  is defined by any social welfare function having the form
ξ α( ) [ ]X Xi
i
n
i=
=
∑
1
(15)
where α i =∑ 1 and α i > 0  for i n= 1, ,K .
ξ ( )X  is obviously symmetric and strictly Schur-concave if α αi i< +1  for i n= −1 1, ,K .
Then ≥W  satisfies the properties WELF and EDEI. Furthermore we obtain
Proposition 12
If ≥W  is represented by ξ ( )X  having form (15), then ≥W  is Τ∗ -homogeneous for all linear
inequality concepts.
Proof
Suppose that X YW~ , then
α αi i i iX Y[ ] [ ]∑ ∑= .
Applying any linear T preserves the equality. Therefore
T X T Y X Y TW
n( ) ~ ( ) , ,for all ∈ ∈ ∗Ω Τ .
This result is relevant since it allows one to choose a social welfare ordering without commit-
ment to an inequality concept. These welfare orderings are compatible with any linear
concept. Therefore, one is able to derive several different inequality orderings (depending on
Τ∗ ). They possess the form presented in section 8 if ξ ( )X  is replaced by the corresponding
linear welfare function. Furthermore, one can try to perform a kind of sensitivity analysis: If X
is more unequal than Y for the Τd
∗
-concept, one can examine for which ′ ≥d d  or ′ ≤d d  that
remains true (given that X Y dn, ∈ ′Ω ).
Consider the Gini-welfare ordering as an example. It is represented by
ξ ( ) ( ) [ ]X
n
i X i
i
n
= −
=
∑1 2 12
1
.
The corresponding inequality measures for absolute inequality are then given by
I X I X u
n
n i X
i
n
i( , ) ( , ) ( ) [ ]ε = = + −
=
∑1 1 22
1
.
For the other concepts we obtain
I X d n
n i X
n
X d
i
n
i
i
i
n
( , ) ( )
( )
( )
[ ]
[ ]
ε ε= −
+ −
−
=
=
∑
∑
1 1 2
1
2
1
1
and
I X u u d n
n i X
n
i X d
d Ri
n
i
i
i
n
( , ) ( )
( )
( )( )
[ ]
[ ]
= −
+ −
− −
∈=
=
∑
∑
1 1 2
1 2 1
2
1
2
1
for .
Unfortunately the decomposition property discussed above is not owned by linear welfare
functions. It requires that α αi j n= =( / )1  for i j n, , ,= 1K  (cf. Ebert (1988)). But then
ξ ( )X  does no longer satisfy the principle of progressive transfers.
11. Conclusion
The abstract definition of a linear inequality concept seems to be appropriate: The definition
comprises relative, absolute, and intermediate inequality (the concepts discussed in the
literature). The characterization of all linear concepts has revealed the ultra-rightist ones.
Furthermore the class of all separable social welfare orderings compatible with these concepts
and the inequality orderings implied could be derived. For relative and absolute inequality
these results were well-known, for intermediate and ultra-rightist inequality they had not been
proven before. In so far, the relevant questions concerning linear inequality concepts and the
corresponding ethical inequality orderings have been answered completely. Dual inequality
measures have been presented. Their definition is appealing and they are an attractive alter-
native to the generalized entropy measures in any analysis requiring the decomposition of
measures.
One question implicitly raised in the introduction has not been answered yet, namely whether
the empirical evidence on the view of inequality can be described by a linear inequality con-
cept. Here the answer, probably, has to be negative. These concepts are still too simple to
explain the empirical findings; i.e. exactly the concepts which are treated in the literature –
the concepts of relative, absolute, and intermediate inequality – can be viewed only as
approximation to the views people hold on inequality. Therefore the next step of tackling the
problem is to consider nonlinear inequality concepts.
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